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BOOK REVIEWS
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, THIRD EDITION.

Edited by Thomas I. Emerson,t David Haber,tt and Norman
Dorsen.ttt Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967. Two Volumes.
Pp. 2274. $45.00.
When the first edition of this work appeared in 1952 it was hard to
visualize a collection of legal and related materials in the field of political
and civil rights as a necessary part of the practitioner's reference shelf.
1952 was the era of American Communications Association v. Douds'
and Feinerv. New York.2 It was the time of the narrow victories of Sweatt
v. Painter' and United States v. Rumely.4
Yet to come were the far-reaching opinions that touched most citizens
directly and have led to voluminous litigation: the development of the
Equal Protection Clause in Brown v. Board o1 Education5 and Baker
v. Carr;' new substantive rights of conscience and speech; 7 new developments in areas covered primarily by legislation, such as welfare; and in
t Lines Professor of Law, Yale University.
tt Professor of Law, Rutgers University.
tt Professor of Law, New York University.
1. 339 U.S. 382 (1950), upholding the Taft-Hartley provision denying the services of
the NLRB to any union who had an officer who had not sworn he did not believe in the
violent overthrow of the government.
2. 340 U.S. 315 (1951), upholding a conviction for disorderly conduct where the
speaker refused a police order to move on because the crowd was getting excited.
3. 339 U.S. 629 (1950), wherein a Negro won admission to the University of Texas
Law School because the Negro school established in response to an earlier suit was in fact
unequal.
4. 345 U.S. 41 (1953), reversing a contempt of Congress conviction because the
particular inquiry was not authorized by the resolution setting up the investigation.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), forbidding race as a valid classification. Despite the emphasis
on the school context in Brown, the results in the later cases were reached in court per
curiam orders simply citing Brown. See, e.g., Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(golf courses) ; New Orleans City Park Ass'n. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks).
6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962), making malapportionment a judicial question under the Equal
Protection Clause.
7. 374 U.S. 398 (1963), holding that a Seventh-Day Adventist who would not work on
Saturday was entitled to state unemployment compensation since a rational relationship to
some state interest is not enough to sustain otherwise valid state legislation where such
legislation could be drawn in another way which would interfere less with First Amendment
rights; 370 U.S. 421 (1962), prohibiting the recitation of a state-drafted, non-sectarian prayer
in the public schools; 384 U.S. 11 (1966), striking down a loyalty oath for teachers which
covered membership in an association unaccompanied by a specific intent to further its unlawful aim; 376 U.S. 254 (1964), reversing a defamating recovery under state law by a public
official where actual malice was not proved; 379 U.S. 536 (1965) and 379 U.S. 559 (1965),
invalidating broad prohibitions against demonstrations in certain public places; cf. 385 U.S.
39 (1966), affirming a trespass conviction based on a demonstration at the jail grounds.
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areas not covered in the present work, such as the establishment of more
definite due process standards for the conduct of criminal proceedings, 8
and their applicability to other proceedings,9 and the establishment of
procedures for insuring their effectiveness. 0
Then too, Congress, albeit belatedly, recognized its primary responsibility under the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to secure for all
citizens those rights of individuals threatened or ignored by the growth
of government on all levels 1 ' and the increasing interdependence of
"private" social ordering.
The speed and scope of these developments is prodigious. The practitioner may no longer assume that the law of political and civil rights is
something he will have to deal with never or only infrequently. The
issues are vital no longer to just those on the fringes of society with
whom an occasional lawyer had contact only after disaster struck. The
issues now are of vital concern to a larger portion of society, that portion
having increasing and primary resort to legal services. The growth of the
neighborhood law offices may be both a cause and effect.
The origin and growth of the materials edited by Professors Emerson,
Haber and Dorsen on political and civil rights is self-evident, and it gives
rise to the strong and valuable features of this edition of their work. It
began as a collection of classroom materials, hence the benefit for the
practitioner of its orientation in terms of problems and, more important,
its inclusion of not just cases, but statutes, regulations, and associated
non-legal materials. Whereas collections of Constitutional Law materials
have traditionally comprised only Supreme Court cases to be used primarily as a vehicle for analysis, the departure here is necessary and
welcome. Today, statutes and regulations as well as opinions of lower
courts, where the primary responsibility of effectuating the substantive
8. 372 U.S. 335 (1963), requiring that indigents be supplied with counsel in felony cases;
367 U.S. 643 (1961), applying the exclusionary rule to unlawfully seized evidence in state
prosecutions; 378 U.S. 368 (1964), forbidding the jury from determining the voluntariness
of a confession at the same time it is passing on guilt; 384 U.S. 436 (1966), excluding a
confession that is the product of custodial interrogation unaccompanied by warnings of the
right to refuse to answer, of the right to counsel, of the right to have counsel supplied, and
that the interrogation shall cease, if requested, until counsel arrives.
9. 387 U.S. 1 (1967), juvenile court and implicitly raising questions on all "civil"
commitments.
10. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to test state confinement
unless there was an intelligent and understanding waiver in the state courts.
11. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964), desegregating all restaurants
and places of public accommodation (except Mrs. Murphy's Boarding House) within the
Commerce Power; the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 1973 (Supp I, 1965), suspending
voter qualification tests in certain areas; the 1968 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284
(April 11, 1968), providing for open housing and providing for sanctions against private
interference with the exercise of federally-created rights.
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guarantees of the 14th Amendment has devolved, are giving content to
new abstract rights of the citizen found in the Supreme Court's opinions.
The two volumes are divided into three parts and Volume One contains
two of them. Part One is captioned "Freedom of Expression." The first
chapter contains essentially non-legal materials on the basic theory of
free speech, going back to Milton's Areopagitica and including excerpts
from Learned Hand's The Bill of Rights1" concerning the role of the
courts. The second chapter reprints excerpts from materials on the
historic development of free speech in this country. This departure from
the problem approach, when coupled with the extensive notes and
references in each following chapter and section, serves as a brief but
almost complete background and context for the problems covered individually later. The following chapters on such problems as "Obscenity,"
"Defamation," "Internal Order," including "Permit Systems," and "Other
Interests," such as the "Adminstration of Justice," are brief and comparatively straightforward when compared with the chapter on "National
Security." Most of the 450 pages of this chapter are devoted to federal
legislation on subversive activities. The section on the post-World War II
period itself has a 2-2 page bibliography. While the inclusion of such
seemingly diverse problems as the denial of social security benefits to
persons deported for certain reasons, and state legislative investigations,
might seem to make such a chapter unwieldy, the utility of the undertaking is saved by a highly articulated organization and table of contents.
There is a danger of confusion for the student here, since he notoriously
does not notice chapter and section headings.
Part Two, "Academic Freedom, Freedom of Religion and other Individual Rights," makes clear demonstration of the value of this entire
edition. A highly detailed table of contents and exhaustive notes and references makes these two volumes the place to begin legal research.
It is to Part Three, all of Volume Two, that I wish to address some
comments and observations. This Part, the most significant and distinctive, is titled simply "Discrimination." Here the advantages of including
material not usually included in casebooks, and the highly articulated
organization, coalesce to distinguish sharply this work from anything that
has gone before. For instance, the materials in the chapter on "Discrimination in Education: South" progress from an excerpt from Wech3 directly to enforcement of
sler's Neutral Principles"
equity decrees and
problems of tokenism. Included not only is the United States Commission
on Civil Rights Survey and Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but the
Statement of Policies under Title VI from the Department of Health,
12. L. HAND, THE BILL o RIGHTS (1958).
13. H. WECHSLER, TOWARD NEUmAL PRmCILES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL

LAW (1961).
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Education and Welfare. So long in coming and so rare are such federal
regulations, and so unlikely are they to change from month to month or
even year to year, they deserve this convenient place between hard
covers. Included, quite naturally next, is the chapter on "Discrimination
in Education: North and West" with lower court cases and other
materials on de facto segregation. The extensive notes and references are
invaluable by virtue of their completeness and, currently, lack of other
materials for the practitioner. Also in this Part are the allied problems
of employment and housing, the latter including among other things
"blockbusting," federal involvement and problems of the benign quota.
It is difficult to conceive of making do without these volumes.
My only comments or observations of a critical nature about this work
do nothing to impair its great value. It seems to me the only sin the
editors have committed is a slight one of omission but not of oversight.
Some issues involving "legal doctrine" rather than "problems" run
throughout several chapters and explicitly are not treated separately let
alone equally. One of them is the problem of "state action." I believe
recent developments indicate that both the student and the practitioner
would benefit from a specific, albeit limited treatment of it. It is becoming a problem of some immediacy and general importance to most men
on the street, rather than merely a problem of abstract or academic
doctrine.
I wish to make it plain that by my comments in this regard I wish
in no way to associate myself with the recent criticism of Constitutional
Law casebooks for their lack of "theory." 1 4 In the first place, I am not
sure that such criticism is directed towards this sort of an undertaking
in that this is not a Constitutional Law casebook for use by students in
a traditional Constitutional Law course. It covers only one aspect of
the traditional course and then in too great a detail for class coverage.
Likewise an advanced or specialized course or seminar could not hope
to cover the over 2200 pages. Further, its price tends to suggest that its
place in the Law School is on the reference room shelf, although there
is for this third edition a less expensively priced "Student Edition." The
lack of theory in a reference book is no handicap, and certainly not in
this case. In general, however, I do not agree with the recent criticism
that present Constitutional Law casebook categorizations subordinate
the ".

.

. concepts which have been most dominant in structuring the

Court's deliberative processes, or which will raise the questions that best
enable us to evaluate the Court's functioning."' 15 There is more than one
way to skin a cat, more than one way to look at any court's opinion let
alone the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. It seems
14. Stone, Towards a Theory of Constitutional Law Casebooks, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 1
(1967).
15. Id. at 4.
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to me the basic Constitutional Law course is a fine time to study substantive concepts. Later on, other courses, such as Legal Process or
Jurisprudence, might focus more productively on how a court decides and
the role of contemporaneous history in the formulation of doctrines. The
criticism continues:
[T]here is a root level at which the controversies producing
all these decisions-whether ultimately cast in the "advisory
opinion" mold or the "political question" mold-share a common syntax: the Court's desire to conserve its fund of good will;
an idea of the just state as one preserving for its citizens "rule
by law"; calculations as to the probability that petitioners
denied review will manage to get redress in some other manner;
desire to spread the base of power. I agree that any teacher
worth his salt will lead his class to these and other factors
tugging the Court at the deeper levels where the really dispositive issues are formulated. But such a response neglects
one of the prime purposes a casebook can serve: to direct our
attentions in such fashion as to expose and bring into dialogue
unexpected relationships from which one may produce a cloth
of meaning from otherwise loose strands.1 6
Try as I may I cannot convince myself that the root level of decisions
cast in the "advisory opinion" mold was not Article III. The fact that
the "case and controversy" requirement makes very good sense should
not be surprising and should not mandate a structuring of a casebook to
bring into dialogue "unexpected relationships" at the expense of the
substantive relationships as yet undiscovered by the student. One should
not confuse the prime function of a casebook with one of the hallmarks
of a good classroom teacher.
I am not suggesting the editors substitute a systematic examination of
"state action" for their treatment of the cases under more substantive
headings because it somehow might produce a "cloth of meaning" otherwise missing on the operations of the court. A study of the way in which
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 7 and Evans v. Newton"8 were
decided and what application beyond their own facts they might have,
especially in the technique of solving future cases, strikes me as still of
uncertain utility. What does concern me, and what I do suggest a brief
look at, is the guaranty of "new" substantive rights under the equal
protection clause by a finding of "state action" where none had heretofore
been found.
16. Id.
17. 365 U.S. 715 (1961), government-owned property leased to private restaurateur
required to be desegregated under the circumstances.
18. 382 U.S. 296 (1966), private park in the hands of private trustees but formerly
held by public trustees required to be desegregated under the circumstances.
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The concept of "state action" was viewed originally as a limitation on
the federal power in the Civil Rights Cases.'9 It has since been expanded
or weakened to include minimal and unauthorized participation of state
officers.2 ° More recently Reitman v. Mulkey 21 has set off a fresh round
of discussion on whether "state action" is any longer a viable concept. 2
Whatever the current vitality of "state action" as a label, there is a
concept presently at work that deserves to be looked at. Plainly the concept presently is being used expansively and not restrictively of the
federal power to insure minimal guarantees to each citizen against
interference from almost any source.
The concept has been described variously:
. . . [E]qual protection of the laws is denied by the state

whenever the legal regime of the state, which numbers amongst
its ordinary police powers the power to protect the Negro
against discrimination based on his race, elects not to do sochoosing instead to envelop and surround the discrimination
with the protection and aids of law and with the assistances of
communal life. 3
Of course, it is easier to fault "state action" than to suggest
a flawless alternative standard. However, an approximation of
the coming standard might suggest that equal protection requires the state to proscribe racial discrimination in the public
life.

24

Heretofore, I had preferred the "State Function" formulation to
justify the reach of the 14th Amendment into areas where the involvement of the state had not been manifest. It had seemed to me much
more useful in a world of legal realism. It had, for me, vague overtones
of an almost moral content, both expansive and restrictive, and yet a
flexibility which the Court could use in accommodating the Constitution
to the changing political realities of American life and the legitimate
expectations of its participants. Recently, however, I have become
enamored of the phrase "substantive equal protection."
19. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
20. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
21. 387 U.S. 369 (1967), invalidating the "Proposition 14" Amendment to California's
Constitution.
22. See Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 Haav. L. Rav. 69 (1967); Note, Uncle Tom's Multi-Cabin Subdivision-Constitutional Restrictions on Racial Discrimination by Developers, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 314
(1968).
23. Black, supra note 20, at 108.
24. Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the State Action Limit on the Equal
Protection Guarantee, 66 CoLum. L. Rav. 855, 870 (1966)

(emphasis original).
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The body of law we have so inelegantly labeled substantive
equal protection straddles the orthodox lines between equalprotection issues and state-action issues. Indeed it threatens
to obliterate the line altogether. It is a result of the "egalitarian
revolution" to which the Warren Court has given crucial
support.25
In a publication that is otherwise so complete and exhaustive, it is
this absence of a systematic look by the editors at "state action," "state
function," "substantive equal protection," or whatever it is to be called,
on the basis that it is somehow a matter of legal theory rather than a
concrete problem of substantive rights that gives me pause. That this
equal protection concept has a substantive content is seen most plainly
in the criminal procedure cases, quite understandably not included in
the present work, especially Griffin v. Illinois 26 and Douglas v. California 7 The notion in the Douglas case seems to be to give the indigent
what the rich man can have, and not just what is necessary for a fair
trial. Involved is not equalization of access to appellate review but
equalization of quality." These cases have significance beyond the question of furnishing transcripts or counsel on appeal. They suggest myriad
other rights of indigent defendants to the practitioner. So too the "egalitarian revolution" or "substantive equal protection" cases in the political
and civil rights area covered in this work by Professors Emerson, Haber
and Dorsen. Whereas Munn v. Illinois2 1 told us what private areas may
be regulated consistent with substantive due process because these areas
were affected with a public interest, the recent cases indicate what "private" areas affected with a public interest must be regulated by the state
to afford equality under substantive equal protection. The editors have
no reference to Munn nor to this concept as a source of rights.
I do not urge a lengthy examination of these cases which already
appear elsewere in the book under more familiar headings, such as
"Housing", "Voting" or "Education." A systematic treatment in great
detail also would raise inevitably the doctrinal and theoretical difficulties raised by others. Rights arising in cases concerned with white
primaries 0 or restrictive covenants 81 or separate-but-equal school facilities32 already have been examined at length and charged with violating
25. Karst and Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 57 (P. Kurland ed.).
26. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
27. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
28. See Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 225 (1968).
29. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
30. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
31. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
32. Brown v. Bd. of Education, supra note 5.
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"neutral principles.""3 To those cases may now be added Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections84 and Reitman v. Mulkey." It might be
suggested by some that the Court has given up its function of legitimating legislative action for one of anticipating it. Whether or not that is a
good idea, the fact remains that new rights have been springing fullgrown like Minerva from the Jovian head of this concept found lurking
in the Supreme Court's opinions. In Reitman, for instance, the court
said that there was more than just a repeal of the fair housing act
involved, but just what more isn't made clear. If the "more" is the
effect on the seller or lessor by Proposition 14 so that the state has encouraged his discrimination, it is hard to see why a failure to pass a fair
housing act in the first place, or a simple repeal, would not have the
same effect and would not equally constitute "state action."
All these cases intimate broader substantive rights than those ultimately granted to the parties in each individual case, so I think something is lost by treating them only as disparate cases. They may stand
for the proposition that the 14th Amendment serves to estop the denial
of the promise of America by either state action or individual actions.
What that promise is, and the quality of public life the citizen has a right
to expect, are worth a generalized, brief look. Both the practitioner with
his whole new class of clients and a whole new spectrum of rights, and
the student with a seemingly new social consciousness, would derive a
practical, as well as a theoretical benefit, from a short systematic treatment of these cases.
Lest I be taken for the man who faults the Rolls Royce for its noisy
clock, let me emphasize the editors have made an invaluably useful contribution. This work is plainly the starting place for the researcher, be
he lawyer or student, and no lawyer's shelf or reference room can be
without it.
Richard H. Seeburger*
33. H. WECHSLER, supra note 13.
34. 383 U.S. 663 (1966), holding poll tax unconstitutional.
35. Supra note 19.
* A.B., Dickinson College; LL.B., LL.M., Harvard University. Associate Professor of
Law, University of Pittsburgh.
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CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, SECOND EDITION.

By Fred

E. Inbaut and John E. Reid.tt Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins
Co., 1967. Pp. xiii, 224. $8.00.
It is perhaps not surprising that the second edition of this book is substantially the same as the first. One might have expected the revised
edition to embrace, or at least recognize, some of the Supreme Court's
understanding of the privilege against self-incrimination that is articulated in Miranda v. Arizona.' But enlightenment, apparently, was expecting too much, particularly in view of the Court's indirect criticism of
the first edition. As a result, the authors have ignored virtually all of the
reasoning contained in the Miranda opinion and have only accepted, albeit
grudgingly, its specific holding.
The second edition of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions says, in
effect, that once the police have complied with the Miranda requirements
and have elicited a waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to
have counsel present, it is business as usual at the station house. This
means that all of the trickery, cajolery, and outright lying that was
described by the Chief Justice with such dismay is resurrected-so long
as the arrestee consents to talk in the absence of counsel (as most will
and do).
Lest there be any doubt, the various forms of "conning" are explicitly
set forth: for example, the interrogator's air of confidence in guilt, expressions of sympathy, minimizing the offense and devising acceptable
motives for it, condemning the victim, and the like. How any of these
tactics can be squared with the Court's emphatic statement that the initial
waiver does not mean a complete abandonment of the fifth amendment
privilege2 is not explained. Because the initial waiver is merely a
relinquishment of the right to silence so that the availability of the
privilege continues throughout the interrogation, the Court's condemnation of deceit is especially instructive: "Moreover, any evidence that the
accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course,
show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege." 3 Even
where the initial waiver is properly obtained, it is clear that the Court did
not intend to permit impairment of the continuing privilege by subsequent
trickery.
It is noteworthy that the authors, in the latter half of the book which
t Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
tt Director, John E. Reid and Associates.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). That expectation is temporarily heightened by the opening
statement of the preface, where the authors acknowledge that the new edition was made
necessary by the decision.
2. Id. at 474.
3. Id. at 476.
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purports to deal with the law governing admissibility of confessions,
devote but a few pages to the cases involving deceit or trickery.4 The
leading case5 is not even mentioned, and another important case is
described under a different heading in terms that omit the central
element of deceit by the accused's "pretended friend." 6
Messrs. Inbau and Reid take the position that without trickery custodial
interrogation would be futile. One wonders why. If the objective is to
obtain voluntary confessions from those sufficiently guilt-ridden to waive
their privilege against self-incrimination in order to unburden themselves,
then the straightforward asking of questions should suffice. Surely if
counsel for the arrestee were present, "the friendly-unfriendly act" could
not occur nor could any of the other forms of loaded questions, cajolery,
and lies. By recommending all the non-violent forms of inquisitional
technique that no defendant's lawyer worth his salt would countenance,
the authors (and the law enforcement groups for whom they presumably
speak) are merely inviting the Court to insist that counsel invariably be
present during any interrogation. This was precisely the position advanced
by one of the amici in Miranda,' and various members of the Court on oral
argument evinced considerable interest in whether counsel had to be
present to insure adequacy of the waiver.8 More important, fairness of
the procedures invoked during the aftermath of the waiver is repeatedly
stressed in the Court's opinion itself.
Finally, the second edition is interspersed with unlawyer-like comments
about "five to four" decisions, "a one man majority," and how the
President can effectively overturn the Miranda decision by judicious replacement of one or more of the sitting Justices. Mention should also be
made of the authors' oft-recurring refrain that their techniques are designed to obtain confessions and admissions from the guilty rather than
the innocent. Passing the philosophical question whether police officials
should be judges in our society as well as the practical question relating
to degrees of guilt, 9 the short answer to their thesis lies in the privilege
against self-incrimination. The availability of that procedural right has
never been limited to the innocent; indeed, by the protection it affords,
4. Their principal objective in the law section appears to be to discredit McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), on the theory that the Court's misapprehension as to
delay in arraignment in that case was caused by an inadequate record.
5. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
6. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
7. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 22-27, Miranda
v. Arizona, supra note 1.
8. See, e.g., L. HALL & Y. KAMasAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDuRE 410-411 (2d ed.
1966).
9. In Spano v. New York, supra note 6, the defendant was deceived into confessing
to a premeditated killing whereas, in fact, his dazed behavior following a severe beating had
probably amounted to either manslaughter or second-degree murder.

1967-1968]

BOOK REVIEWS

437

the privilege appears to have been designed primarily for those guilty of
some offense to some extent or another.
In addition to overturning Miranda, Escobedo v. Illinois,0 and Malloy
v. Hogan," the authors apparently would like to undo the fifth and sixth
amendments and a few hundred years of British constitutional history
as well.' 2 Some of us hope they will be unsuccessful.
Victor M. Earle, III*
10. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
11. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
12. Congress has recently added to the clamor. Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. II (June 19, 1968).
* A.B., Williams College; LL.B., Columbia University. Member of the New York Bar
and General Counsel, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., New York City and counsel for
petitioner in Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S. 493 (1966), decided with Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).

